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Abstract
Telling a lie takes longer than telling the truth but precisely why remains uncertain. We investigated two processes
suggested to increase response times, namely the decision to lie and the construction of a lie response. In Experiments 1
and 2, participants were directed or chose whether to lie or tell the truth. A colored square was presented and participants
had to name either the true color of the square or lie about it by claiming it was a different color. In both experiments we
found that there was a greater difference between lying and telling the truth when participants were directed to lie
compared to when they chose to lie. In Experiments 3 and 4, we compared response times when participants had only one
possible lie option to a choice of two or three possible options. There was a greater lying latency effect when questions
involved more than one possible lie response. Experiment 5 examined response choice mechanisms through the
manipulation of lie plausibility. Overall, results demonstrate several distinct mechanisms that contribute to additional
processing requirements when individuals tell a lie.
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Introduction
People lie surprisingly often, a task which requires a number of
complex processes [1]. For example, 40% of adults have reported
telling a lie at least once per day [2]. The majority of these lies are
likely to be trivial in nature, serving a communicative function [3–
5], however, others can have more drastic consequences, such as
those told by criminal witnesses and suspects [6–10]. Despite the
apparent prevalence of lie-telling within society, lying is a
complicated behavior that requires breaking the normal, default
rules of communication [11]. The liar must first of all decide not to
assert the truth, and then must assert an alternative statement that
is plausible and appears informative to the listener, all the while
concealing any outward signs of nervousness. Such a pragmatic
feat requires cognitive processes in addition to those used when
telling the truth. In this article we investigate what those processes
might be. As such, we are less interested in the intent to instil a
false belief in another’s mind but more interested in the necessary
and universal cognitive processes associated with making a
statement that is not true. The research presented here may be
far removed from an aggressive interrogation where lives or liberty
are at stake; but, the fundamental cognitive processes that are
taking place when someone either tells the truth or constructs a
falsehood are going to have some aspects in common regardless of
the situation. The aim of the current research is to understand
better these cognitive processes.
Our starting point is to examine the reasons given in the
literature for why lying appears to be more difficult than telling the
truth. Longer lie times, for example, must be indicative of
additional cognitive processes involved in lying compared to telling
the truth. Based on a framework developed in 2003 [1], we will
discuss three processes that have been implicated in lying and
summarise the empirical evidence in favour of each.
Suppression of the truth
Our default communicative stance is to tell the truth. Without
the assumption that speakers utter the truth most of the time, it is
difficult to see how efficient communication could ever occur [11].
This suggests that when people wish to lie to a question they will
need to intentionally suppress the default, truthful response, which
should increase the difficulty of lying relative to telling the truth.
There is indeed plenty of empirical evidence consistent with the
claim that telling lies involves suppressing the truth. For example
many researchers have found longer response times for lying
relative to telling the truth [1,12–17], and there is neuroscientific
evidence that brain regions active in lying overlap with brain
regions associated with general response inhibition [18–22].
A number of these studies have been based around a lie
detection technique known as the Concealed Information Test
(CIT) [23]. This typically involves the presentation of a variety of
different images or words via a computer screen. Some of these
stimuli relate to previously learned information, known as probes,
whereas others are irrelevant items. In practical situations,
individuals may be asked the identity of a murder weapon, with
the probe item being an image of the actual murder weapon (i.e., a
knife) embedded within a series of irrelevant images (i.e., a gun, a
hammer, a baseball bat). Participants are instructed to deny
recognition of all items. If participants have concealed knowledge
and recognise the murder weapon, they are expected to respond
differentially to probe and irrelevant items. Although traditionally
used to examine physiological responses, such as skin conductance
[16] and event related potentials [24–26], this paradigm has
recently been used with response times to successfully discriminate
‘‘guilty’’ from ‘‘innocent’’ participants, with guilty participants
taking longer to deny recognition of probes than irrelevant items
[16,27,28]. It has been argued, however, that such paradigms
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measure the possession of concealed knowledge rather than
deception per se [14] and therefore may not allow us to fully
elucidate the distinct processes involved in responding to questions
deceptively.
These findings have meant that recent cognitive models of
deception have incorporated both the automatic activation of the
truth and its resultant suppression as additional processes that
contribute to longer response times for liars [1,20,29–31]. For
example, the Activation-Decision-Construction Model (ADCM)
[1,31] claims that following a question, relevant information (in
particular, the truth) is automatically activated in long-term
memory [32]. This information is then made consciously available
in working memory [33]. In order to respond to a question
deceptively, cognitive resources are required to inhibit the truthful
response. Similarly, the Working Model of Deception (WMD) [30]
highlights response inhibition as a pre-requisite to responding to a
question deceptively.
While the need to suppress the truth is undeniably an important
component of why lying is more difficult than telling the truth,
there are several other reasons that have received less attention in
the literature and that might also contribute. These are discussed
below.
The decision to lie
Assuming that people tell the truth by default [11], they must
make a conscious choice to lie. The decision to lie is therefore
likely to be an additional cognitive process associated with lying
that takes time to execute. Indeed, current models of how we lie
include a lie decision component. For example, the Working
Model of Deception (WMD) [30] assumes that when an individual
hears a question to which they may respond deceptively, executive
control processes are used to determine the appropriate response
(i.e., lie or truth), with a decision being made based on the likely
risks and benefits involved. Similarly, the Activation Decision
Construction Model Revised (ADCM-R) [34] considers individ-
uals who have previously decided to lie to particular questions and
have rehearsed an answer. In these cases, the model states that a
decision is still required because individuals must remind
themselves of their decision to lie when that particular question
is heard.
Despite the inclusion of decision components in the models,
there is surprisingly little work that has specifically investigated
how people make the decision to lie. This is perhaps because it is
experimentally much easier to instruct people when to lie than to
allow them to choose. We can find only a few papers that have
investigated the decision process [21,31]. The first of these [31]
presented participants with a selection of neutral questions and
questions probing embarrassing information. Participants were
instructed to lie to certain questions, such as those regarding their
employment history, and tell the truth to others, such as those
regarding what they did on Sunday morning. However, for
general questions, they were instructed to answer truthfully unless
a question probed embarrassing information about which they
would normally lie to a stranger, in which case they should lie. In
this condition, participants needed to decide themselves when to
lie and when to tell the truth. The experiment demonstrated that
more time was needed to respond when individuals chose to lie
compared with when they had been instructed, and both took
longer than telling the truth, consistent with the idea that the
decision of how to respond adds to cognitive processing load.
However, it is difficult to be certain whether the elevated response
times were due to the evaluation of whether a question was
embarrassing or to the decision of how to respond.
The second of these papers [21] allowed participants to choose
whether to lie or tell the truth to computer-generated yes-no
questions regarding an embarrassing past life event, although
participants were asked to achieve an approximate balance
between truths and lies over the course of the experiment. Brain
activity (using neuroimaging techniques) was recorded rather than
behavioural data. Similar to findings when individuals have been
instructed on how to respond [12,15,20,35], lying showed
increased activation of the ventrolateral prefrontal cortices
(implicated in deceptive capabilities [20]) compared to truth-
telling. However, because there was no direct comparison of trials
between choosing to respond and being instructed to respond,
little can be concluded about the decision process itself.
Construction of the lie
Lies and truths also differ in the way in which they are
constructed. It is often the case that more than one possible lie is
available. In this case the particular lie produced needs to be
explicitly chosen from a range of alternatives. For a lie to be
convincing then it must be plausible and consistent with previous
information and so selecting such a lie introduces additional
constraints. Truths, on the other hand, seem to be generated
automatically without a need to always select ‘‘which’’ truth, since
stimulus questions must merely be evaluated in relation to known
information [36]. The procedures needed to choose which lie to
use and to verify the plausibility may be costly to operate.
One study [31]directly tested whether the added complexity of
lie construction was a contributing factor to elevated lie response
times. Their approach was to manipulate whether participants
responded to open-ended questions, such as, ‘‘What color is your
hair?’’ or yes/no questions, such as, ‘‘Is your hair brow-
n?’’(Although we appreciate that differing definitions of open-
ended questions exist, for clarity we use the same terms as the
above cited paper). It was argued that more lie construction was
needed to respond to open-ended questions than yes/no questions
because open-ended questions required explicit retrieval of
information from long-term memory, whereas yes/no questions
merely needed the production of an affirmation or denial. If lie
construction was contributing to longer lie response times, then
lying to open-ended questions should be more difficult than lying
to yes/no questions. Consistent with these predictions, longer lie
response times were observed in the open-ended question
condition than in the yes/no condition [31]. There are a number
of issues that make the interpretation of this result difficult,
however. First, while lying to open ended questions was slow
relative to yes/no questions, telling the truth was also slow. It is
therefore not clear whether their effect relates to lie construction or
to the difficulty of responding to open-ended questions in general.
Second, the content of the question was not equated across yes/no
and open-ended conditions. For example, response times to
questions such as ‘‘Do you like chocolate’’ were compared with
questions such as ‘‘How many credit cards do you own?’’
Differences in response times could therefore be explained by
differences in the ease of accessing information, rather than the
question types per se.
While there has been no direct evidence about how people
assess the plausibility of potential lies, there is indirect evidence
that complex lies are costly to generate. If a person needs to
monitor plausibility of a lie then this will be more difficult for more
complex lies. First, studies investigating the effects of making lies
more complex have found that they are easier to detect. For
example, asking participants to recall events in reverse order [10]
and using interview techniques that require longer answers to
questions [37] have increased discrimination between liars and
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PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 April 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 4 | e60713
truth tellers. Finding that lies are easier to detect when the lie is
more complex suggests that extra resources are needed to
construct the plausible lie.
Secondly, if lie construction independently contributes to the
processing difference between lying and truth-telling, individuals
who have been given the opportunity to rehearse or prepare a lie
response will require less processing time than unprepared liars.
Several studies have found evidence that this is the case. A review
of the literature conducted in 1981, found that the response time
difference between lying and truth-telling only occurred when
participants had not rehearsed a response [17]. A recent meta-
analysis of 158 cues to deception similarly found that longer
response times for liars only demonstrated a significant effect size
when participants were not given the opportunity to prepare their
lie [38]. Alternative paradigms incorporating an explicit period of
rehearsal have shown smaller response time differences between
rehearsed lies and truths compared to unrehearsed lies and truths
[34].
In summary, we have reviewed the evidence for three processes
involved in lying that are not involved in telling the truth. There is
substantial evidence that the first process, the suppression of the
truth, contributes to the extra costs involved in lying, but the
evidence for the other processes is weaker. Our study therefore
concentrates on testing whether the decision to lie and the
construction of the lie contribute to the greater difficulty of lying,
as distinct from suppressing the truth. In doing so, we hope to
understand in more detail what cognitive processes are involved
when people lie.
Cognitive load
The aspects of lying described above all arguably add to the
cognitive load of the process. Adding additional cognitive load to a
deception situation has been shown to be effective in lie detection
research. In support of this idea, studies investigating the effects of
making lies more complex have found that they are easier to
detect. For example, asking participants to recall an event in
reverse order [10] or using interview techniques that require
longer answers to questions [37], have been shown to increase
discrimination ability between liars and truth tellers.
Although cognitive load provides a basis for current theoretical
considerations of deception, its underlying mechanisms and
processes are not fully understood. For example, while the
cognitive load approach suggests that telling a lie is cognitively
more complex than telling the truth and will result in behaviour
that highlights this additional mental effort, such as a decrease in
body movements and an increase in response time, there is no in-
depth explanation of precisely why deception is more cognitively
challenging, or the particular processes involved in any deceptive
encounter. This is what the current study aims to explore.
The Current Study
Our paradigm involved presenting participants with a colored
square and asking them to lie or tell the truth about the color. We
used vocal onset time as the dependent measure. This paradigm
allowed us to focus on two main aspects of the lie process, namely,
the suppression of factually truthful information and the produc-
tion of an alternative, false response, since both should be required
when falsely describing the color of a square. In Experiments 1
and 2 we investigated the decision to lie by comparing trials in
which participants chose whether to lie or tell the truth compared
to being instructed. In this way, it was possible to evaluate whether
the process of making the decision to lie had a carryover effect into
the lie itself. In the real world setting a person needs to decide to lie
rather than being directed to lie and so in our pared-down version
of the process it would be important to know whether differences
present when deciding to lie are the same as those when directed
to lie. In Experiments 3, 4 and 5 we investigated the lie
construction process by comparing one possible lie response to a
choice of two or three lie response possibilities, and by
manipulating the plausibility of particular lie responses.
The color-naming paradigm that we have developed is different
to the paradigms generally used in lie research. For example, in
previous studies, participants have watched a simulated crime and
lied about the protagonist [39], or been questioned by an
interviewer regarding their background and instructed to lie about
certain details [40]. The reason for the difference in methodology
is that most of the previous research into lying has been concerned
with lie detection whereas we are interested in the underlying
cognitive processes. Deception researchers, understandably, are
interested in the measure which is most able to distinguish lies
from truths, whether that is skin conductance [41], facial
expressions [42], or offline measures such as linguistic analyses
[43], none of which are necessarily indicative of cognitive
processes.
When researchers have used more traditional cognitive markers
of deceit, such as response times, the emphasis has been on
discovering whether a difference between lies and truths exists and
how these compare to other ways of differentiation of deception
[16]. Our experiments were designed to isolate the individual
components of lying, however, which required eliminating as
much variability as possible. We therefore removed factors such as
the stress associated with lying, or the incentive to lie, which by
their nature may variably affect the process [14,15,44,38]. We
consider the processes investigated here – the suppression of the
truth and the production of alternatives – to be involved in every
instance of lying and are therefore fundamental to the cognition of
lying. Stress, the incentive to lie, and other situational factors need
to be considered beyond the basic cognitive processes considered
here.
Experiment 1
There were two goals for Experiment 1. First, to establish
whether our paradigm produced results consistent with the past
literature on lying; specifically, that lie responses require slower
response times than true responses [15,45]. Second, we wanted to
investigate the effects of deciding to lie by manipulating whether
participants chose to lie, or whether they were directed to lie.
Thus, prior to the presentation of the colored square, participants
were either presented with an instruction to lie or tell the truth in
their response or were given a choice between the two. On the
latter trials, participants had to input their decision (lie or truth) on
the keyboard. Once the square was presented, participants had to
vocally respond with either the true color of the square, or lie
about its color. We reasoned that the decision-making process
would be involved in the former but not the latter condition and
this would be reflected in differences in lying latency.
Different decision processes make different predictions about
the interaction between the type of instruction (directed or given a
choice) and the honesty of the response (truth or lie). We consider two
possibilities. First, the decision to lie could be a departure from the
normal, truth-telling state. Deciding to lie, rather than adhering to
the default truth, would therefore require extra processing effort.
This is the basic idea behind the decision components of the
ADCM [34] and WMD [30]. If the decision to lie is more difficult
than the decision to tell the truth, participants should need
relatively longer to lie than to tell the truth in the choice condition
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compared to the directed condition. In short, there should be an
interaction between instruction and honesty with a larger
difference between lies and truths in the choice condition. Second,
deciding to lie could be no different to deciding to tell the truth. As
such, the having to make the decision will not impact upon the size
of the lie/truth difference in reaction times. Having to choose a
response would generally be more difficult than being directed on
the response and so longer overall latencies might be expected for
the directed compared to the choice conditions, and longer lie
latencies than truth latencies. Under this account then, only main
effects of type of instruction and honesty would be expected.
Method
Participants. Twenty-one Cardiff University undergraduate
psychology students volunteered for this study in exchange for
course credit. Of these, 20 were female. Participants had a mean
age of 19.52 (SD = 0.68; Range = 18–21) and spoke English as
their first language. For this experiment, and all subsequent
reported experiments, ethical approval was granted by the School
of Psychology Ethics Committee at Cardiff University. In
accordance with this, informed written and oral consent was
obtained from all participants prior to the experimental task.
Design. A 2 x 2 within-subjects design was used, with the
independent variables being honesty of response (lie vs. truth) and
type of instruction (choice vs. directed). The dependent variable
was response time. A total of 192 trials were included, with 64
from the directed to lie condition, 64 from the directed to tell the
truth condition and 64 from the choice condition. The order of
trials was randomised for each participant.
Procedure. The experiment progressed as a series of trials
each of which began with the presentation of one of three words in
the centre of the computer screen (LIE, TRUTH or CHOICE).
Participants were asked to indicate whether they understood by
pressing the ‘T’ key when presented with the word ‘TRUTH’, the
‘L’ key when presented with the word ‘LIE’ and either the ‘T’ or
‘L’ key when presented with the word ‘CHOICE’, according to
whether they chose to lie or tell the truth. Participants were asked
to choose to lie and choose to tell the truth at least 10 times each,
to enable data from both responses to be collected. The word
remained on the screen until the participant pressed the
appropriate button and was then replaced with either a blue or
a red square. Participants then had to say either the true color of
the square or lie about the color of the square by claiming that it
was the opposite color (e.g., blue if it was red). Voice key responses
were recorded via a clip microphone. An example of a directed
trial and a choice trial are presented in Figure 1. After the vocal
response was made, the next trial began after 500 ms. Instructions
were presented on the screen and emphasised the importance of
responding both as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Participants took part in a practice block of 12 trials identical to
the main trials. The question ‘What color is the square?’ was
visually presented prior to both the practice block and the block of
main trials. All stimuli were presented on a black background, with
the squares being of equal size and the text being presented in
Arial font, size 40.
Results
Two subjects were removed from the analysis because they
failed to follow experimental instructions of choosing to lie at least
10 times in the choice condition. All participants chose to tell to
truth at least 10 times.
We treated response times greater than 2 s (approximately 3
SDs above the grand mean) as outliers in all of the experiments
reported in this paper. Response times longer than this represent-
ed an excessively long time to retrieve the name of a color, and we
found that using this cut-off meant that a similar number of
outliers were eliminated across conditions. There were 103 (less
than 3%) outliers in total, with 95 of these being a result of
microphone problems (the microphone failed to pick up the initial
answer). No responses were less than 100 ms. Inaccurate responses
(132) were also removed from the analysis. Overall, there were 13
(2.0%) inaccurate responses in the choice lie condition and 53
(7.9%) in the choice truth condition, X2(1) = 25.6, p , 0.05.
There were 36 (2.7%) errors in the directed lie condition and 30
(2.2%) in the directed truth condition, X2(1) = 0.6 p . 0.05. In
total, 235 out of 3,648 data points were removed from the analysis.
Mean response times for the four possible treatment combina-
tions are presented in Figure 2. In contrast to either of the
hypotheses considered above, there appears to be a large
difference between truth and lies in the directed condition but
not in the choice condition. To test this pattern we conducted a
repeated-measures ANOVA with factors of type of instruction and
honesty of response. We found a main effect of honesty with true
responses being faster than lie responses, F(1,18) = 7.89, p , .05,
g2 = .31, and a main effect of type of instruction with responses in
the choice condition being longer than in the directed condition,
F(1,18) = 17.28, p , .001, g2 = .49. The interaction was also
significant, F(1,18) = 9.97, p , .005, g2 = .36. The faster
production of true than lie statements was significant in the
directed condition, (Directed - Truth: M = 758.85, SD = 111.08;
Directed - Lie: M = 822.98, SD = 110.86; F(1,18) = 21.88, p ,
.001, g2 = .51), but not in the choice condition, (Choice - Truth:
M = 854.02, SD = 118.12; Choice - Lie: M = 857.39, SD =
109.83; F(1,18) = 0.40, p = .84, g2 , .01, CI = [–32, 38]).
Discussion
When directed to lie or tell the truth, participants in our
experiment needed on average 60 ms longer to lie than to tell the
truth. This result demonstrates that our paradigm produces data
consistent with previous research investigating response time and
lying [1,15,31]. One way in which this result extends previous
work, however, is that the role of the lie construction process was
minimal in our experiment. Participants did not have to consider
what an appropriate lie response might be (the only possible lie
response was the alternate color) nor did they have to construct a
convincing lie sentence. The most likely explanation for the
differences in lie times is therefore that participants needed time to
suppress the truth when lying.
The main aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the effects of
deciding to lie over being directed to lie. We were interested in
whether there was a cost associated with deciding to lie in
particular [34] or whether there was a general cost associated with
having to choose a response compared to being directed.
Surprisingly, the findings of Experiment 1 were not consistent
with either of these possibilities. Although we observed an
interaction between honesty of the response and the type of
instruction, the difference between lying and telling the truth was
significantly greater in the directed condition than in the choice
condition; indeed, there was no significant difference between
lying and telling the truth in the choice condition and there were
significantly more errors in the truth condition. Before discussing
the theoretical implications of these findings, however, we consider
one factor that could have obscured differences between condi-
tions in the choice condition.
Participants were slower to respond overall when they had to
choose their response type than when they were directed on the
response type. Also, participants were making more errors in the
choice condition. In the choice condition, participants pressed a
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button to indicate their choice, whereas in the directed condition
participants saw the word ‘‘truth’’ or ‘‘lie’’. Participants therefore
received a visual prompt regarding the response type in the
directed condition but not in the choice condition. A greater
degree of uncertainty about the expected response in the choice
condition could therefore explain longer latencies overall, which
could in turn have obscured honesty differences. We address these
problems in Experiment 2 by providing a visual prompt to
participants in both the choice condition and the directed
condition.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 used a similar design to Experiment 1 except that
participants were given a visual reminder of their decision in the
choice condition, just as they were in the directed condition.
Method
Participants. Twenty-three Cardiff University students were
paid for participation in the experiment. Of these, 14 were female.
Participants had a mean age of 21.65 (SD = 4.59; Range = 18–37)
and spoke English as their first language.
Design. The design of the experiment was the same as that
shown in Experiment 1. However, we increased the total number
of trials to 200 to ensure an equal number in the choice and
directed conditions overall (100 in the choice condition, 50 in the
directed to lie condition and 50 in the directed to tell the truth
condition).
Procedure. The task was a modified version of that described
in Experiment 1 and involved the presentation of one of two words
in the centre of the computer screen (READY or CHOICE).
When the word ‘READY’ was presented, participants were
instructed to press the space bar. When the word ‘CHOICE’
was presented, participants could press either the ‘T’ or the ‘L’
key, depending on whether they had chosen to tell the truth (T) or
lie (L). On a ‘READY’ trial, the key press was followed by either
the letter ‘L’ (relating to lie) or ‘T’ (relating to truth) presented in
the centre of the screen for a one second period. On a ‘CHOICE’
trial, the key press was followed by a visual reminder of what key
was pressed by presenting either an ‘L’ or a ‘T’ in the centre of the
screen for a one second period. A colored square would then
appear on the screen and the participant would report its true
color or lie about it. The time taken to do this was recorded via a
voice key. Examples of a directed and a choice trial are presented
in Figure 3. The presentation of visual prompt was the only aspect
of the procedure that differed from Experiment 1.
Results
One participant was removed from the analysis because they
failed to follow experimental instructions of choosing to lie at least
10 times, providing a final sample size of 22. There were 100
outliers (2.3%) in total, with 67 of these being a result of
microphone problems. No responses were less than 100 ms. These
were removed from the analysis. Inaccurate responses (126) were
also removed from the analysis. There were 25 (2.3%) inaccurate
responses in the choice lie condition and 53 (4.8%) in the choice
Figure 1. Example of trials in Experiment 1: a) Directed, b) Choice.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060713.g001
Figure 2. Response times of Experiment 1 as a function of type
of instruction and honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060713.g002
Telling Lies
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 April 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 4 | e60713
truth condition, X2(1) = 10.4 p , 0.05. There were 28 (2.5%)
errors in the directed lie condition and 20 (1.8%) in the directed
truth condition, X2(1) = 1.4, p . 0.05. In total, 226 out of 4,400
data points were removed from the analysis.
Mean response times for the four possible treatment combina-
tions are presented in Figure 4. Overall, telling a lie took longer
than telling the truth, F(1,21) = 84.66, p , .001, g2 = .80.
Choosing how to respond took longer than being directed, F(1,21)
= 5.55, p, .05, g2 = .21. There was also a significant interaction
between the type of instruction and honesty of response, F(1,21) =
5.93, p , .05, g2 = .22, such that there was a greater difference
between lying and telling the truth in the directed condition,
(Directed - Truth: M = 668.73, SD = 142.87; Directed - Lie: M
= 763.06, SD = 159.57), than in the choice condition, (Choice -
Truth: M = 707.83, SD = 152.75; Choice - Lie: M = 769.94, SD
= 167.12). This shows a similar pattern to Experiment 1, where a
response time difference for lies and truths was only shown in the
directed condition. Simple main effects analysis found that the
effect of honesty of response was present in the directed condition,
F(1,21) = 80.30, p , .001, g2 = .79 and, in contrast to
Experiment 1, it was also present in the choice condition, F(1,21)
= 31.82, p , .001, g2 = .60. Participants also took longer to
respond when they chose to tell the truth compared to when they
were directed to tell the truth, F(1,21) = 16.65, p , .001, g2 =
.44, whereas there were no differences in response times when
individuals chose to lie compared to when they were directed to
lie, F(1,21) = 0.25, p = .62, g2 = .01, CI = [–21, 35].
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 provide further support for the
finding that telling a lie takes significantly longer than telling the
truth. In contrast to the findings of Experiment 1, this occurred
both when individuals were directed in their response and when
they chose their response. Furthermore, we no longer observed
that responses in the choice condition required longer than in the
directed condition. These findings suggest that the extra overall
processing cost of making a choice in Experiment 1 was likely due
to participants having difficulty in recalling their chosen response
type. Nonetheless, we observed a significant interaction between
type of instruction and honesty of response and an increase in
errors for truths in the choice condition, just as we did in
Experiment 1. The response time difference between lying and
telling the truth was smaller when participants chose their response
than when they were directed to do so. In particular, participants
were slower to respond with the truth when they chose the
response compared to when they were directed to do so, but lying
was much less affected by the choice manipulation. No explana-
tion based on retrieval of the decision can be invoked because the
visual prompt provided was identical for both conditions. The
choice condition, however, provided slightly more time in terms of
preparation. This is because the time between the participant
making the choice and pressing the appropriate key would have to
be added to the 1000 ms preparation time that is available in both
choice and directed conditions. The fact that there is still a
significant difference between time to lie and time to tell the truth
means that this additional preparation time does not negate the
key findings.
Neither of the decision making mechanisms that we discussed in
Experiment 1 were borne out by the data. It is not the case that
telling the truth is always the default option and that people have
Figure 3. Example of trials in Experiment 2: a) Directed, b) Choice.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060713.g003
Figure 4. Response times of Experiment 2 as a function of type
of instruction and honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060713.g004
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to choose to lie but not to tell the truth, otherwise we would have
observed larger differences between truths and lies in the choice
condition than the directed condition, nor is it the case that
needing to choose a response is simply more difficult overall than
being directed to respond. The decision mechanism involved in
choosing whether to lie is therefore more complex than previously
thought [34]. Our suggestion for how the decision mechanism
functions is as follows. First, we assume that when people lie they
must necessarily suppress the truthful response. This accounts for
longer latencies for lies relative to truths in both choice and
directed conditions. In addition, when people have to make an
active decision of how to respond, the evaluation of these
competing response possibilities is likely to invoke conflict
monitoring processes. The conflict of choosing between a truth
or lie response, compared to no such action being required in the
directed condition, leads to overall longer response times for the
choice condition. This evaluation of competing responses in
authentic decisions is represented overtly when participants choose
between a T or L response on the keyboard. Once individuals
have considered these competing possibilities and made a response
decision, the alternative, unused response will then require
suppression. This suppression of the alternative response requires
longer processing time for both lie and truth responses. Since liars
are already suppressing the alternative response (the truth) on
directed trials, this suppression only represents an additional
process on choice trials for truth tellers, who now have to suppress
a lie response.
It should be noted, however, that the findings of these two
experiments relate specifically to questions where only one
response alternative to the truth is available, such as yes-no
questions. These findings have yet to be confirmed with questions
involving more than one lie response option, although there is no
reason to believe that the overall pattern of findings relating to the
decision process would differ.
Experiment 3
In Experiments 1 and 2 participants did not have a choice about
which lie they told. When the square was red, for example, they
had to lie with ‘‘blue,’’ and vice versa. The lie construction element
was therefore minimal. Lying is often more complicated than this
however, because liars have to construct a lie from a range of
alternatives, as we discussed in the Introduction. Experiment 3
investigated which parts of the lie construction process contribute
to longer response times.
We manipulated the range of lie and truth responses available to
participants. In one condition, the square could be of one of two
colors, as in Experiments 1 and 2. This is similar to yes-no
questions, as in ‘‘Is your hair brown?’’ In the other condition the
square could be one of three colors, similar to more open-ended
questions, such as ‘‘What color is your hair?’’ The three-color trials
therefore required a choice about which lie to use, whereas the
two-color trials did not. All participants were directed about
whether to lie, as in the directed conditions of Experiments 1 and
2. If the need to choose a lie contributes to the greater difficulty of
lying, longer lie response times will be observed in the three-color
lie condition than the two-color lie condition. Alternatively, longer
response times might be observed in the three-color condition for
both lie and truth responses.
Method
Participants. Thirty-six Cardiff University students partici-
pated in this study in exchange for payment. Of these, 26 were
female. Participants had a mean age of 21.83 (SD = 3.60; Range =
18–38) and spoke English as their first language.
Design. We used a 2 x 2 design with honesty of response (lie
vs. truth) and number of response possibilities (two-color vs. three-
color) as within-subjects factors. The dependent variable was
response time. The paradigm consisted of two blocks of trials. The
two-color block showed participants one of two colored squares
and their lie response could only be the opposite color (hence one
possible answer). The three-color block showed participants one of
three colored squares and their lie response could be either of the
other two colors (therefore a choice of two possible answers). The
order of these blocks was counterbalanced across participants to
minimise order effects. The color pair that participants were given
in the two-color block (red/green, green/blue, blue/red) was also
counterbalanced across participants so that all color combinations
were present in all conditions. Participants took part in a practice
block of 12 trials identical to the main trials. A total of 202 main
trials were used in the paradigm: 100 in the two-color condition
and 102 in the three-color condition.
Procedure. As in Experiment 1, the task involved the
presentation of one of two words in the centre of the computer
screen (LIE or TRUTH) and participants indicated that they
understood by pressing the ‘T’ key when presented with the word
‘TRUTH’ and the ‘L’ key when presented with the word ‘LIE’. A
colored square (blue, red or green) was then presented. Partici-
pants were required to lie or tell the truth about the color seen.
Responses were recorded using a voice key. An example trial is
shown in Figure 5.
Results
There were 181 outliers (2.5%) in total and 62 of these were a
result of microphone problems. No responses were less than
100 ms. These were removed from the analysis. Inaccurate
responses (175) were also removed from the analysis. There were
38 (2.1%) inaccurate responses in the two-color lie condition and
50 (2.8%) in the two-color truth condition, X2(1) = 1.7, p . 0.05.
There were 51 (2.7%) inaccuracies in the three-color lie condition
and 36 (2.0%) in the three-color truth condition, X2(1) = 2.6, p .
0.05. Altogether, 356 out of 7,272 data points were removed from
the analysis.
Mean response times for the four possible treatment conditions
are presented in Figure 6. A repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted with factors of honesty of response and number of
response possibilities. Consistent with Experiment 2, telling a lie
took longer than telling the truth, F(1,35) = 139.79, p , .001,
g2 = .80. There was also a main effect of number of response
possibilities, F(1,35) = 4.11, p , .05, g2 = .10 and a significant
interaction, F(1,35) = 31.78, p , .001, g2 = .48, showing the lie-
truth difference was significantly larger in the three-color condition
than in the two-color condition. Simple main effects analysis
revealed that the effect of honesty of response was significant in the
two-color condition, F(1,35) = 46.51, p , .001, g2 = .57 and in
the three-color condition, F(1,35) = 112.02, p , .001, g2 = .76.
The interaction was driven by longer response times for lying to
questions in the three-color condition compared to questions in the
two-color condition, (Two-Color - Lie: M = 866.16, SD =
153.13; Three-Color - Lie: M = 937.41, SD = 153.07; F(1,35) =
12.51, p , .001, g2 = .26), and no effect of number of possible
responses on truthful responding, (Two-Color - Truth: M =
812.86, SD = 141.86; Three-Color - Truth: M = 807.94, SD =
122.67; F(1,35) = 0.11, p = .74, g2 , .01, CI = [–25, 35]).
In order to identify whether participants used one particular
color more often than any other, we also examined which colors
participants chose when they lied in the three color condition. Red
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was chosen 33% of the time, blue 35% of the time and green31%
of the time. However, none of the colors were chosen more often
than chance, t(35)’s , 1.40, p’s . .18.
Discussion
In Experiment 3 we found that lying takes longer than telling
the truth in both color conditions. More interestingly, we also
found that there was a greater difference between lying and telling
the truth in the three-color condition compared to the two-color
condition. The interaction was driven by a significant increase in
the time taken to lie to three-color compared with two-color
questions and a nonsignificant difference in the time taken to tell
the truth, consistent with the claim that lie construction is a costly
process. Unlike other studies that have tested the difference
between different question-types [31], our findings cannot be
explained by differences in question content across conditions.
There are at least two explanations for why we observed a larger
cost of lying in the three-color condition compared to the two-
color condition. The first is that participants had to choose a lie in
the three-color condition but not in the two-color condition (the lie
was simply the one remaining option in the two-color condition).
Having to make any kind of choice may have slowed participants
down. The second is that participants could have been evaluating
each of the possible lie responses in turn for their acceptability.
Because there were twice as many possible lie responses in the
three-color condition compared to the two-color condition,
participants would have had to evaluate twice as many possibilities
in the three-color condition than the two-color condition. There
may be both a fixed cost of choosing and a cost to evaluating each
alternative, or there could be one or other. In Experiment 4 we
test whether participants evaluate each alternative.
Experiment 4
If participants evaluate each of the possible lie responses in turn,
expanding the range of possible lie options should continue to add
time onto lie latencies. Conversely, if the cost we observed is a
choice cost, expanding the range of options should not result in a
proportional increase in lie latencies (there would be a single
choice cost regardless of the number of possible lie responses).
Experiment 4 tested these explanations by comparing trials with
two possible lie responses (a three-color condition, as in Experiment
3) against trials with three possible lie responses (a four-color
condition).
Method
Participants. Thirty-two Cardiff University students partic-
ipated in this study in exchange for course credit. Of these, 29
were female. Participants had a mean age of 18.94 (SD = 0.95;
Range = 18–21) and spoke English as their first language.
Design. We used a 2 x 2 within-subjects design, with honesty
of response (lie vs. truth) and number of response possibilities
(three-color vs. four-color) as within-subjects factors. The depen-
dent variable was response time. The paradigm consisted of two
blocks of trials. The three-color block showed participants one of
three colored squares and their lie response could be either of the
other two colors (hence two possible answers). The four-color
block showed participants one of four colored squares and their lie
response could be any of the other three colors (hence three
possible answers). The order of these blocks was counterbalanced
across participants to prevent order effects. The colors that
participants were given in the three-color block (red/green/blue,
green/blue/purple, blue/purple/red, purple/red/green) were also
counterbalanced across participants so that all color combinations
were present in all conditions. Participants took part in a practice
block of 12 trials identical to the main trials. A total of 202 main
trials were used in the paradigm.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that used in
Experiment 3 except that participants saw one of four colored
squares in the four-color condition.
Figure 5. Example of a three-color lie trial from Experiment 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060713.g005
Figure 6. Response times of Experiment 3 as a function of
number of response possibilities and honesty. Note: Error bars
are standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060713.g006
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Results
There were 174 outliers (2.7%) in total. 78 of these were due to
microphone problems. These were removed from the analysis.
Inaccurate responses (260) were also removed from the analysis.
No responses were less than 100 ms. There were 69 (4.3%)
inaccurate responses in the three-color lie condition and 75 (4.7%)
in the three-color truth condition, X2(1) = 0.3, p . 0.05. There
were 59 (3.7%) inaccuracies in the four-color lie condition and 57
(3.6%) in the four-color truth condition, X2(1) = 0.1, p . 0.05.
Altogether, 434 out of 6,464 data points were removed from the
analysis.
Mean response times for the four possible treatment combina-
tions are presented in Figure 7. A repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted with factors of honesty of response and number of
response possibilities. This found a significant main effect of
honesty of response with true responses being faster than lie
responses, F(1,31) = 117.06, p , .001, g2 = .79. However, in
contrast to the findings of Experiment 3, a further increase in the
number of possible lie responses did not affect response times in
either the truth, (Three-Color - Truth: M = 728.96, SD =
121.51; Four-Color - Truth: M = 726.17, SD = 106.90; F(1, 31)
= 0.04, p = .84, g2 , .01, CI = [-25, 30]), or lie conditions,
(Three-Color - Lie: M = 875.34, SD = 171.42; Four-Color - Lie:
M = 888.39, SD = 148.72; F(1, 31) = 0.35, p = .56, g2 , 05,
CI = [–58, 32]), nor was the interaction between number of
response possibilities and honesty of response significant, F(1, 31)
= 0.57, p = .46, g2 , .02, showing that the lie-truth difference
was not significantly larger in the four-color condition than in the
three-color condition. A power analysis revealed that if the
interaction was as large as we found in Experiment 2, i.e., g2 =
.26, we would have had a 99% chance of finding the effect.
As in Experiment 3, we investigated how participants chose
their lie response. In the 3-color block, participants chose red 36%
of the time, blue 31% of the time, green 31% of the time and
purple 28% of the time. A one-sample t-test found that purple was
used less than would be expected by chance, t(23) = 2.53, p, .05,
but that red, blue and green were not, t(23)’s , 1.70, p’s . .11. In
the 4-color block, participants chose red 29% of the time, blue
20% of the time, green 27% of the time and purple 18% of the
time. A one-sample t-test found that red was used more than
chance, t(31) = 2.28, p , .05, whereas blue, t(31) = 3.18, p ,
.005 and purple, t(31) = 3.58, p , .001 were used less than
chance. The use of the green did not significantly differ from
chance, t(31) = 0.83, p = .41.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 4 support previous findings of
increased response times when individuals lie compared to when
they tell the truth, regardless of the number of possible lie
responses available. We also found that the number of possible lie
responses did not significantly affect response times when
individuals told the truth, consistent with the results of Experiment
3. Unlike Experiment 3, however, in this experiment no significant
differences were demonstrated when individuals lied in the three-
color compared to the four-color block and a power analysis
indicated that we had a 99% chance of detecting an effect of the
same size as that observed in Experiment 3. The processing time
difference between questions with multiple response possibilities
and those with only one response option is therefore likely to be
due to the cost of choosing between lies in working memory, and
not due to costs associated with evaluating each possible lie
response in turn. We are not arguing that participants will never
consider additional lie options in turn (or that lie times will never
increase with options greater than three); rather, that the cost of
having to choose per se will always be at least part of the extra cost
of lying in multiple lie contexts.
It can be argued that individuals use a variety of strategies when
generating lies in authentic settings, such as manipulating truthful
information [38], and that our paradigm prevents this, and as
such, prevents generalization to authentic settings. Indeed, our
paradigm severely limits the available lie responses. However,
three points should be considered here. Firstly, there are many
situations that require individuals to complete the relatively simple
task of choosing a lie response from a predetermined set of
possibilities. For example, if asked the color of someone’s hair,
individuals can choose between a predetermined set of acceptable
hair colors in creating their lie response. Secondly, there are
certain situations whereby lies are entirely false and do not involve
any manipulation of the truth, such as denying recognising a well
known acquaintance. Thirdly, it could be considered that using a
different color as the lie response is to some extent an alteration of
the truth, and as such, all lies involve a degree of alteration of
truthful information, regardless of the specific context of the
individual lie. Further considerations relating to lie selection,
specifically the differing plausibility and acceptability of particular
lies, are now addressed in Experiment 5.
Experiment 5
In our previous experiments we showed that choosing between
multiple lie responses increases response time. It should also be
considered, however, that for the majority of lies some responses
will be more plausible than others and the successful liar will need
to consider this when selecting their response. The more plausible
a response, the more likely that it will be chosen above other
possibilities, since this increases the likelihood that a lie will be
believed. In order to prevent implausible responses being used as a
lie, like the truth, they become unacceptable answers to questions
and must be suppressed alongside truthful information. What
makes the task even more difficult is that a particular response is
not necessarily implausible per se but depends on the question
asked and the context (much like the truth). For example, ‘‘On the
moon’’ would be a perfectly plausible (or truthful) answer to some
questions, just not the location of the stolen money. Overall then,
in any deceptive interaction there will be particular lies that cannot
be used if the deception is to be successful. This discrimination of
plausible and implausible lies can be considered a form of rule
Figure 7. Response times of Experiment 4 as a function of
number of response possibilities and honesty. Note: Error bars
are standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060713.g007
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constraint, with limitations on the particular response that can be
effectively used.
We are not aware of any evidence, however, that directly
addresses the question of how implausible responses are discrim-
inated from plausible responses, or how they are suppressed when
people lie. One possibility is that plausibility computations are
carried out in long term memory and that only plausible responses
are transferred to working memory to be articulated. The ADCM
assumes a similar process. An alternative, however, is that since
lying is arguably an act that works against standard communica-
tive principles [11], plausibility constraints may have to be
implemented at a higher level than other language mechanisms.
In order to override the use of truthful information when
answering a question, lying may involve explicit, goal-oriented
suppression of the default response. This may require distinct
processes to be implemented in working memory. Experiment 5
was designed to test between these two accounts.
Participants engaged in a color naming task similar to
Experiments 3 and 4. The difference was that in Experiment 5
we introduced constraints on which lies (colors) participants could
use. Specifically, we told participants that they would have to
name squares of three different colors, red, green, and blue either
truthfully or untruthfully, but that they were not allowed to lie with
one of the colors (red, say). We therefore had lie and truth trials. In
the lie trials they would have to say whatever color was presented
whether it be green, blue or red. The lie trials were broken down
depending on the plausibility constraint. When the colored square
was the disallowed lie color (red), participants had the choice of
two lie possibilities (blue and green). We refer to these as lie control
trials because the lie possibilities were the same as if no constraint
was introduced. When the square was one of the allowed lie colors
(green, say), participants could not say the prohibited lie color (red)
and hence had to choose the other lie color (blue). These were lie
constraint trials.
If plausibility constraints are implemented in long term
memory, only allowable responses would be transferred into
working memory. In the lie control trials, this would mean two
potential lie responses, that is, green and blue, but in the lie
constraint trials, only one possible response would be available,
i.e., green (or blue). From Experiment 3 we know that lying with
two possible responses is more difficult than lying with only one
possible response, hence RTs in the lie control trials should be
slower than those in the lie constraint trials. Alternatively, if
plausibility constraints are implemented in working memory,
participants would have two lie responses in working memory in
both conditions. They would then have to explicitly suppress the
disallowed lie response in the lie constraint condition, which
should take additional time, as it did when participants suppressed
the truthful response throughout Experiments 1–4. RTs to the lie
constraint condition should therefore be higher than in the lie
control condition.
Method
Participants. Thirty undergraduate psychology students
volunteered for this study in exchange for course credit. Of these,
29 were female. Participants had a mean age of 20 (SD = 3.2;
Range = 18–33) and spoke English as their first language.
Design. A 2x2 within-subjects design was used, with honesty
of response (truth vs. lie) and plausibility (constraint vs. control) as
within-subjects factors. The dependent variable was response time
measured in milliseconds (ms). A total of 408 trials were included
in the main experimental task, with 68 from the lie control
condition, 68 from the truth control condition, 136 from the lie
constraint condition and 136 from the truth constraint condition.
The order of trials was randomised for each participant.
Procedure. A similar paradigm was used to Experiments 3
and 4, with the presentation of either the word TRUTH or LIE in
the centre of the computer screen. Once again, participants
pressed the ‘T’ key when presented with the word TRUTH and
the ‘L’ key when presented with the word ‘LIE’. This was followed
by the presentation of either a blue, green or red square. As before,
participants then had to say either the true color of the square or
lie about the color of the square by claiming that it was a different
color. Prior to the main trials, participants completed a short
practice block containing 4 trials.
In contrast with our previous experiments, participants were
instructed that they could only use two of the presented colors as
their lie response and could not use the third color as a lie answer
(e.g., participants could use green red or blue but not red). The
particular color (red, blue or green) that participants were
instructed against using as a lie was counterbalanced across
participants.
Results
There were 264 outliers (2.2%) in total. 256 of these were due to
microphone problems. These were removed from the analysis. No
responses were less than 100 ms. Inaccurate responses (363) were
also removed from the analysis. Overall, there were 55 (2.7%)
inaccurate responses when participants lied in the control
condition and 53 (2.6%) when participants told the truth in the
control condition, X2(1) = 0.1, p . 0.05. There were 162 (4.0%)
when participants lied in the constraint condition, and 93 (2.3%)
when participants told the truth in the constraint condition, X2(1)
= 19.2, p . 0.05. In total, 627 out of 11,970 data points were
removed from the analysis.
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with honesty
(truth vs. lie) and plausibility (constraint vs. control) as within-
subjects factors. A main effect of honesty was demonstrated,
F(1,29) = 145.52, p , .001, g2 = .83, such that lie response times
were significantly longer than truth response times, for both
control and constraint trials. In addition, a main effect of
plausibility was demonstrated, F(1,29) = 14.89, p , .005, g2 =
.34 and a significant interaction between honesty and plausibility,
F(1,29) = 23.27, p , .001, g2 = .44, such that the lie-truth
difference was significantly larger in the constraint condition than
in the control condition. This interaction was due to significantly
longer response times when participants lied in the control
condition compared to the constraint condition (Lie - Control: M
= 909.56, SD = 175.51; Lie - Constraint: M = 860.16, SD =
151.06; F(1,29) = 40.48, p , .001, g2 = .58). This finding is
evidence in favour of constraints being applied in long-term
memory. Little difference was shown between the two conditions
when individuals told the truth (Truth - Control: M = 762.73, SD
= 148.29; Truth - Constraint: M = 774.53, SD = 156.15; F(1,29)
= 2.06, p = .162, g2 = .07). Mean response times for the four
possible treatment combinations are shown in Figure 8.
Discussion
The main effect of honesty of response shown in our previous
experiments was also demonstrated in Experiment 5, with lying
taking longer than telling the truth in both the constraint and
control conditions. Two main predictions were considered
regarding the choice between lie possibilities in relation to
response plausibility. These focused on whether implausible lies
entered working memory and were considered in the decision
process, or whether such responses were inhibited prior to this in
long-term memory systems. Our findings support the latter
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hypothesis because there were significantly longer lie responses in
lie control trials compared to lie constraint trials. If both
implausible and plausible lies were transferred to, and active in
working memory, then a choice would be required between them
(as seen in Experiment 3). This would result in little response time
difference between the lie control and lie constraint conditions,
since a choice would be required between two possible responses
in both conditions. Our findings suggest instead that the
implausible lie response is inhibited prior to this decision process,
so a decision between the two possibilities is not required (since
only one color can be plausibly used). This supports the suggestion
(consistent with the ADCM) that implausible lies are inhibited in
long-term memory and only plausible lies enter working memory
systems.
General Discussion
The aim of the current study was to investigate the cognitive
processes that occur when people lie. Telling a lie typically takes
longer than telling the truth and we were interested in
understanding why. We organised our experiments around three
potential contributing factors: suppressing a truthful response; the
decision to lie; and the construction of a lie. We now summarize
our results and describe their implications with respect to these
factors.
Suppression of the truthful response
In all of our experiments in which participants were instructed
to lie, lying response times were longer than truthful response
times. More interestingly, we observed this result under conditions
in which many of the factors that are usually considered to slow
down lying were absent. In particular, participants did not need to
construct a plausible lie (in Experiments 1 and 2 only one possible
lie response was available) nor did they need time to decide to lie
(Experiments 3, 4 and 5 removed the decision process completely).
According to models such as the ADCM Revised [34], the only
process left to explain longer lie response times is that the truthful
response needs to be suppressed. Our experiments therefore
provide direct evidence that suppression of the truthful response is
a contributing factor to longer lie response times.
While we agree that suppression is part of the explanation, it is
important to outline the different mechanisms by which suppres-
sion might lead to slower response times. One possibility is that
lying is a multi-stage, serial processing mechanism in which the
truthful response is retrieved and enters into working memory first,
it is then rejected (because a lie is needed), and then a lie response
retrieved. Telling the truth, in contrast, is only a single-stage
processing mechanism, in which the truthful response is retrieved
and enters into working memory. Under this account, the
difference in response times between lies and truths is due to
having to retrieve two responses in the lie condition (the lie and the
truth) and only one in the truth condition (the truth). An
alternative but similar proposal is that lying involves rejecting a
response, whereas telling the truth does not. Perhaps rejection is a
conscious process that takes time.
A more distinct alternative is that the processes that underlie
suppression of the truth occur in parallel, and in long-term
memory, not in serial, short term memory. Assuming that response
time is determined by variation in activation levels across the
response possibilities (with large differences in activation levels
being associated with short response times), reducing the activation
of the truthful response might reduce overall variation in
activation levels. This would make it more difficult to generate a
response when lying than when telling the truth because it would
be more difficult to select one response over the others. While this
might explain why lying takes longer than telling the truth on some
occasions, it is unlikely to be a general explanation. First, recent
brain imaging research has found increased activation of brain
areas associated with working memory when individuals lie [22].
The extra cost of lying cannot therefore be restricted to long-term
memory under all circumstances. Second, lying involves deliber-
ately choosing not to say the truth [46]. Now, since working
memory is typically associated with conscious awareness [47],
lying should involve truthful responses entering working memory
(and being suppressed in working memory).
The two types of suppression that we have identified may both
be correct but apply under different circumstances. Serial
suppression in working memory is likely to be the more standard,
day-to-day type of suppression in which a speaker lies to an
unexpected question on a single occasion. However, if a speaker
has to lie on multiple occasions to the same question, or they are in
a situation in which lying is likely to be common and expected,
they may be able to suppress truthful answers in long-term
memory, almost ‘‘forgetting’’ the truth because the lie response has
been so frequently associated with a given question.
The decision to lie
Experiments 1 and 2 tested the role of the decision process by
comparing response times in trials in which participants chose to
lie with trials in which they were directed to lie. While we found
effects of deciding to lie in both of our experiments, we discovered
that there was a much greater cost to deciding to tell the truth than
deciding to lie, relative to the cost of being directed in the
response. Thus, although it has been suggested that the decision
contribution to elevated lie response times is at least partially
determined by the difficulty in lying [34], our data show that this
process also occurs for decisions related to truthful responses. Our
general view is therefore that there is no cost of deciding to lie per se
but there is a cost to choosing to depart from the norm for that
context. Most of the time when people lie they will be departing
from a truth-telling context, which is likely to incur a cost, but in
some contexts, e.g., interrogation situations, or playing poker,
delays may be experienced when the decision is taken to tell the
truth.
One caveat to our conclusion is that when people choose to lie
they often do so on the basis of the question that they are asked,
whereas in our experiments the choice was internally driven. For
Figure 8. Response times of Experiment 5 as a function of
truthful color and honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060713.g008
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example, a person may choose to lie to questions about the
whereabouts of a suspect but not about their own activities.
Evaluating the content of the question is a component of the
decision process which is not included in our task. It could
therefore be that the evaluation component of the decision process
contributes to elevated lie latencies. However, we feel that this cost
is also caused by a departure from the normal communicative
stance. This is because if the person would normally tell the truth,
the question needs to be evaluated in order to decide to lie, but if
the person expects to lie, the question needs to be evaluated in
order to decide whether to tell the truth. Thus, the departure from
the norm is the causal factor, not the decision to lie.
Second, we observed longer response times when participants
told the truth in the choice condition compared to the directed
condition. This occurred across both experiments and therefore
was not related to differential visual availability of the response
type across conditions. As a consequence of this effect, the
difference between lying and telling the truth was greatly
diminished in the choice conditions (to the extent that we did
not observe a significant difference in Experiment 1). What is
different about choosing to lie compared to being directed to lie?
One hypothesis is that choosing to lie means considering lie and
truthful responses. For example, when deciding whether to lie to a
red square, the responses ‘‘blue’’ (the lie) and ‘‘red’’ (the truth)
become activated. Consequently, in our study, there was a small
(or nonexistent) response time difference between truthful and lie
responses in the choice condition because both responses were
highly activated under both response conditions. In contrast, being
directed to tell the truth means that only the truthful response
becomes activated (there is no need to consider and suppress the
lie response), but being directed to lie means that the truth and the
lie response become activated (the truth is always activated). In
other words, both response types were activated in the choice-lie,
directed-lie, and choice-truth conditions, but only the truth was
activated in the directed-truth condition.
Finally, these results should be considered in relation to
practical situations. In almost all lie detection work participants
are directed to lie or tell the truth rather than choosing to do so
whereas when people lie in everyday situations, they choose to lie
rather than being directed. Our experiments show that the
difference between lying and telling the truth is much smaller
when participants are given a choice. This should certainly be
considered in further work targeted at more practical settings,
since such lies may therefore be less detectable when using
automated lie detection techniques.
The construction of a lie
There is a strong intuition that lying takes longer than telling the
truth because lies need to be constructed whereas truths do not.
Yet, the evidence we reviewed in the Introduction was inconclu-
sive about why, or even whether, this was the case. Our
experiments make two novel contributions to understanding the
construction component of lying.
First, having to make a choice about which lie to use from
many, arbitrary possibilities is difficult. Experiments 3 and 4
demonstrated that when participants had to choose a lie they were
slow at responding, but, crucially, the same range of response
options did not slow truthful responses. Even after hundreds of
trials, and with only two choices, participants experienced
difficulty in making an arbitrary choice when they were forced
to lie. It seems that part of what makes lying difficult is resolving all
of the inconsequential decisions that are needed in order to
construct a story. When telling the truth, the ‘‘decisions’’ are
determined by fact, or by memory, and are therefore relatively
resource free.
Second, and somewhat conversely, when there is a clear
preference about which lie is the most appropriate, lying is
relatively easy. In Experiment 5 we found that when participants
were prevented from using one lie response out of two (but were
required to use both responses when stating the truth), participants
behaved as if there was only one possible lie available. Rejection of
the implausible lie occurred in long term memory, as if no choice
between lies was necessary. One caveat to this result is that our
effects were obtained over many trials with the same plausibility
constraint applied on each occasion. It may be the case that
making plausibility assessments in unrehearsed lie situations is
much more difficult. We leave this investigation to future research,
however.
Our results on lie construction additionally make one suggestion
that contrasts with previous claims that yes/no questions provide
better indicators of deceit than open-ended questions [1,31,34].
These claims are based on findings of greater response time
differences between lies and truths when participants lied to yes/
no compared to open-ended questions. In contrast, we found a
greater difference for questions with more than one possible lie
response. We suggest that different patterns arose because different
methodologies were used across studies. In our experiments,
participants answered the same type of question in both conditions
and the truthful answer was equally accessible across conditions. In
the above cited papers, however, different types of questions were
asked across conditions and the truthful answer could have been
more difficult to retrieve in the open-ended questions (hence
truthful response times were longer in the open-ended condition).
While we agree that the difficulty of retrieving truthful information
contributes to the response time difference between lies and truths,
we feel that this issue is orthogonal to the issue of yes/no vs. open-
ended questioning. The results of our experiments on lie
construction suggest that an interviewee may need more time to
lie to an open-ended question than to a yes/no question, ceteris
paribus, because they need to choose which lie to use in the open-
ended case but not in the yes/no case. Before any firm conclusions
can be drawn regarding the effect of question type on the
optimisation of deception detection, however, the likely accessi-
bility of truthful information and the situational context should be
further examined.
Limitations and future directions
The paradigm that we used appears quite different to the usual
methods of investigating how people lie [10,48]. For example,
participants were not asked to lie about personal information, nor
was there an interlocutor present asking questions. Further, there
was no incentive to lie, which should have meant that there were
no stress effects. We argued in the introduction that the method we
employed is a powerful technique without which we would not
have been able to address the detailed processing questions
discussed above. It is important, however, to consider the
relationship between our task and lying outside of the laboratory.
Similar to many cognitive experiments [15,21,29,49], our
paradigm did not require participants to engage in the direct
deception of another individual. They were producing verbal
responses recorded by a computer, and there was no human
‘‘addressee’’ to fool. While this procedure means that participants
may have felt that the task was different to lying in everyday life,
they were performing operations that must necessarily be present
in even the most simple of lies independently of both the intention
and motivation to deceive. What is important is that participants
in our study intentionally and knowingly produced falsehoods.
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While there are situations in which a person can knowingly
produce falsehoods without lying (e.g., when both parties are
aware of the falsehood) there are very few situations when lies are
produced without falsehoods [50]. Clearly, however, it is possible
that the effects found in our experiments may interact or be
overshadowed by the affective components of lying, such as guilt,
stress or negative emotions in general. Future studies may be able
to test these interactions by, for example, inducing negative moods
in participants in the laboratory [51,52].
Atypically for research in deception, participants in the current
study had to lie when a representation of the truth was in front of
them. For example, participants had to lie, ‘‘red’’ when the truth, a
yellow square, was present on the screen (compare this with a
study in which participants are asked to lie about having
performed an everyday act [53]). One likely effect of having the
visual stimulus on the screen would be to make it more difficult to
suppress the truthful response when lying. This design, therefore,
maximised the suppression effect so we could manipulate
particular components of the lie process. Despite the likelihood
of larger effects, however, there is no reason why the overall
difficulty should have interacted with the difference between
choosing to lie and being directed to lie (Experiments 1 and 2) or
the difference between one and two or three plausible and
implausible lie possibilities (Experiments 3, 4 and 5). Both lying
about a visual stimulus and lying about the content of memory
involve suppression of the truthful response and the experiments
reported here investigated this suppression. Furthermore, partic-
ipants were not being presented with the color name, i.e., a
possible response, only a colored square. This meant that the
truthful response still needed to be recalled from memory, just as if
we had asked them what they were up to the night before last.
Lastly, we acknowledge that only a single cue to deception was
used as a measure of cognitive load. Although response times are a
well regarded measure of cognitive processing, other researchers
have recommended the use of multiple cues to detect deceit [54],
including blink rate [55] and body movements [56], and this
should be considered in practical lie detection settings.
Conclusion
Despite the wealth of research investigating lying in general,
such as lie detection [37], the social psychology of lying [3,4] and
the linguistics and philosophy of lying [50], very little work has
been conducted on how we lie. Our study has tried to address the
imbalance by investigating why people take longer to lie than to
tell the truth. We come to three conclusions. First, lying involves
suppressing truthful information and suppressing or rejecting a
default response will increase response time. Second, there can be
costs associated with choosing to tell the truth, just as there can be
with choosing to lie. We therefore maintain that the decision to
depart from the normal type of communication can be costly, and
while this will often be a cost associated with a decision to lie, it is
not an obligatory component of lying. Lastly, lying often requires
more choice in generating a response than telling the truth. There
is typically only one truth but there are many possible lie options.
Making a choice about which lie to use is a difficult job and
contributes to the longer time needed to tell a lie.
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